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 Abstract 
This paper models the investment behaviour of a multi-asset firm with market power that 
accumulates valuable intangible assets to complement the IT capital. The investment model 
is estimated using data from Spanish banks on assets of different nature: material (branches, 
financial), immaterial (advertising and IT) and intangible (training of workers). The paper 
estimates that the representative bank spends five additional Euros per Euro invested in 
IT-related assets in complementary intangible assets or, equivalently, intangibles amount 
to approximately 10% of the economic value of the representative bank. The remaining 
economic value is distributed between 28% from rents attributed to market power, and 62% 
to the cost of market-purchased assets. 
Keywords: multi-asset firm; investment; intangible assets; banks. 
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1 Introduction 
Intangible assets have received increasing recognition as sources of the economic value of 
individual firms [Lev (2001); Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002); Hulten and Hao (2008)] and as 
sources of countries’ economic growth [Buiges, Jacquemin, Marchipont (2000); Corrado, 
Haltiwanger, Sichel (2005); Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009); Marrano, Haskel and Wallis 
(2009), Fukao et al. (2009)]. Assets identified as intangibles are not homogenous, and their 
measurement raises controversies. Most often, intangibles refer to immaterial assets, such as 
those resulting from R&D, advertising and information technology (IT) expenditures. However, 
intangible assets are also defined, in a more restrictive way, as the assets that firms build 
up internally as a sub-product of their regular activities, such as production of goods and/or 
investment in market-purchased assets. Examples of the latter are the “organizational capital” of 
Prescott and Visscher (1980) and the “organization capital” of Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) 
and Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005).1 Both immaterial and intangible assets are most often 
registered as expenses of the year by conventional accounting practices, even though these 
expenditures increase future consumption opportunities and they could be justified being 
accounted as investments [Blair and Wallman (2001); Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009); 
Corrado, Haltiwanger and Sichel (2005)]. 
Different approaches have aimed to obtain a measure of the unreported intangible 
assets of firms, though they present several caveats. The approach of measuring the amount of 
intangible assets as the difference between market and book value of the firm [Hall (2001) and 
Villalonga (2004)] does not separate the cost of investment in the assets and the economic value 
that those assets contribute to create (economic rents).2 The use of expenditures reported in 
separate lines of the income statement to obtain estimates of the stock of intangibles [a practice 
going back to Griliches (1981)], common in macro-economic analysis [Corrado, Hulten and 
Sichel (2009); Marrano, Haskel and Wallis (2009), Fukao et al. (2009)], abstracts from the ex-ante 
investment decision process of the firms, and does not make an explicit distinction between 
market-purchased assets and assets resulting from production and/or investment activities, such 
as organization capital. Oliner, Sichel and Stiroh (2007) use the model proposed by Basu, Oulton 
and Srinivasan (2003) to obtain estimates of intangible capital related to IT. In this model, the IT 
capital and the intangibles are complementary assets that are combined to generate flows 
services used as inputs of the production function of the firm. Assuming that firms choose the 
mix of IT and intangibles in an efficient way, the growth of the (invisible) stock of intangibles can 
be estimated as a function of the growth of the (observable) IT capital. Nonetheless, the model 
does not explicitly link intangibles with the outcome of adjustment costs, nor does it consider the 
possibility of market power of banks. Finally, hedonic-price approaches to measuring the value of 
intangible assets [Cockburn and Griliches (1988), Hall (1993)] estimate the marginal contribution 
of each asset to the value of the firm, tangible and intangible, but do not separate the estimated 
marginal contribution in purchase costs, adjustment costs (that may turn into organization 
capital) and contribution in the form of rents, from market power. 
                                                                          
1. Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and Cummins (2004) say that the word intangibles should be used only to refer to built-in 
intangibles, such as organization capital. In this paper, we make a distinction between immaterial (advertising, and IT 
purchased in the market) and intangibles. 
2. Another problem is that the market price of the shares of firms may be affected by bubbles, and other possible 
inefficiencies, causing a deviation between the market and the fundamental value of the firm. 
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This paper proposes an ex-ante decision model of the investment behaviour of a multi-
asset firm that provides a comprehensive approach to the valuation of the firm and of all its 
invested assets. The results of the model are empirically applied to data from Spanish banks for 
the period 1984-2003, to obtain estimates of the value of the stock of intangible assets built in 
the process of investing in IT capital. Recent research on the so-called “IT revolution” and “new 
economy” has called attention to how advances in IT opened the way to new work processes, 
new job definitions and new management functions in firms of all economic sectors. The new 
business models lowered the costs of the old activities and allowed firms to implement new ones 
[Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002)]. In this paper, we have grouped all these capabilities, 
resulting from investment and use of IT-related assets, under the “organizational capital” of the 
firm. Therefore, our approach to the measurement of intangibles makes an explicit distinction 
between market-purchased immaterial assets (advertising and IT capital) and intangibles that are 
internally generated as a sub-product during the process of making IT capital fully productive. 
With the data available for each bank on expenditures in training workers, we obtain estimates of 
the part of the adjustment costs that become intangible assets. These intangible assets are a 
part of the human capital that enables workers to use computers more efficiently [Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)]. Finally, we split the value of intangibles into their cost of 
accumulation, and the value of the rents from market-power that these intangibles may generate. 
The theoretical model is drawn from the theory of investment of a multi-asset firm that 
maximizes its economic value subject to adjustment costs of growth [Wildasin (1984); Hayashi 
and Inoue (1991); Brynjolfsson and Yang (1999); Bond and Cummins (2000)]. We extend the 
basic model in two ways: i) firms have market power; and ii) the intangible assets that firms build 
in the process of making IT capital productive (organizational capital) contribute positively to the 
profits of the firm.3 Bond and Cummins (2000) modelled and estimated the investment equation 
for the multi-asset firm, but assumed perfect competition and do not explicitly relate adjustment 
cost from IT assets accumulation with the outcome in the form of organizational capital. 
Brynjolfsson and Yang (1999) and Cummins (2004) link the adjustment costs from IT investment 
with built-in intangibles, but they model the valuation equation of the firm (not the investment 
equation, as we do in this paper), they assume perfect competition, and they do not make 
explicit the contribution of the built-in intangibles to profits. 
 In the empirical application, the paper uses estimates of the stock of several 
market-purchased assets valued at replacement cost: material assets (branches and equipment), 
immaterial assets (advertising and IT capital), financial assets, and human capital (from training). 
The theory predicts that, if the adjustment costs (such as the costs of training workers to use 
computers) turn into valuable intangible assets, then the estimated adjustment cost of investing 
in IT capital will be decreasing with the marginal economic value of these intangibles. The other 
prediction (related to the extensions of the investment model) states that banks with market 
power will invest at a lower rate than banks with no market power. The empirical estimations of 
the investment equation for the multi-asset bank do a good job in explaining the value-
maximizing investment behaviour of Spanish banks. The empirical results confirm that human 
capital from training workers is an intangible asset built in the process of investing in IT that 
contributes to the economic value of the bank. Finally, the results also confirm that banks have 
market power, especially in the deposits market. The assets that seem to contribute to market 
                                                                          
3. Market power can be interpreted as a hidden cost of growth, since it implies that as firms expand capacity they will lower 
future revenues of output from current capacity, since they will have to lower the price as a way to increase demand. This 
cost has been considered in single-asset investment models based on Euler’s equations [Schiantarelly and Georgoutsos 
(1990), Bond and Meghir (1994)]. 
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power are advertising capital and (marginally) intangibles (no evidence is found of a contribution 
for IT, physical or financial assets).4 
To our knowledge, this is the first application of the multi-asset Tobin’s q investment 
model to banks, and also the first to study in depth the process of IT investment and intangibles 
in the banking industry. The distinct feature of the banking firm in the model is that the 
investment in financial assets, which is one of the explanatory variables of the investment 
equation, can be used to infer possible restraints on the banks in satisfying their requirements of 
regulatory capital. The empirical analysis finds no evidence of such restraints, probably because 
the time period considered in this study has been relatively favourable in terms of macro-
economic conditions, and banks have been able to meet their solvency requirements without 
major difficulty. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the derivation 
and interpretation of the investment function for the multi-asset bank. In Section 3, we present 
the description of the database, the results of the empirical estimation of the investment equation 
using data from Spanish banks, and a discussion of the results. The conclusion summarizes the 
main results of the paper. 
 
                                                                          
4. Besides the debate on whether IT investment turns into intangible assets or not [see for example the different views on this 
issue by Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) and Cummins (2004), there is another debate on whether IT-related assets give a 
competitive advantage to firms, so that investment in IT turns into economic rents [Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj and Konsynski 
(1999)] or not [Carr 2003)]. See Beccalli (2007) for an empirical analysis of the relationship between IT investment and the 
profitability of banks, using accounting data. 
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2 The investment model 
2.1 Hypotheses 
We consider a bank that issues equity to finance the assets needed to produce and deliver 
banking services, and also to satisfy the minimum regulatory equity requirements. 
The economically optimal volume of equity on the liability side of the balance sheet of the bank 
will then be equal to the sum of the stocks of physical assets, IT-related assets, advertising 
capital (operating assets of the bank), and the stock of financial assets, all on the asset side of 
the balance sheet. We do not model the choice of the capital ratio of the bank, but consider that 
banks’ equity always satisfies the minimum capital requirements set by regulation. From these 
assumptions, we can focus on the optimal decisions concerning resources that are the 
counterpart to the equity on the asset side of the balance sheet, including the financial assets. In 
this section, we formulate the model that determines the investment equation for a general firm 
with N different assets, assuming that the firm has market power, and that there is one asset for 
which adjustment costs turn into valuable intangible assets (organizational capital). 
In each time period, the firm/bank decides how much to invest in each type of N different 
market-purchased capital goods, It = (I1t, I2t,…,INt). The firm holds a stock of capital services at the 
beginning of the period t, Kt-1=(K1t-1,…,KNt-1) that changes over time as the result of new 
investments and of the depreciation of old ones, 
   0and M 1,....,jfor 1 ,1,,   sIKK stjstjjstj   (1) 
where j is the depreciation rate of capital asset j. 
To make fully productive the new invested assets, the firm has to incur adjustment costs. 
Let C(.) be the adjustment cost function that is assumed separable in the adjustment costs of 
each of the assets in which the firm invests, 
   


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j
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j
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j
j
jjjss KaK
Ib
pIKCIKC
2
2
,),(  (2) 
where bj is a positive (cost) parameter and aj is the stationary investment rate for which 
adjustment costs are zero (in general equal to the depreciation rate), and pj is the market 
purchase price of one unit of asset j. The adjustment cost function is defined in Euros of new 
investments that do not turn into capital stock of the respective productive asset.5 
The new assumption introduced in the paper is that the adjustment costs incurred 
in certain investments are accumulated into a valuable intangible asset (valuable 
because it positively affects the cash flow of the firm). In the paper, sub-index k identifies 
the assets whose investments imply building complementary intangible assets. In the empirical 
analysis, k will be limited to IT capital and the associated intangibles are, among others, those 
accumulated in the form of human capital from training workers in the use of computers, and 
related assets. Let Mk be the stock of intangible assets resulting from expenditures in the form of 
                                                                          
5. Although it would be realistic to assume a non-separable adjustment cost function, for simplicity, we maintain the 
assumption of separable adjustment cost functions. 
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adjustment costs associated with the market- purchased asset k. The stock Mk will vary over 
time as the net result of depreciation and the flow of new intangibles from current expenses in 
adjustment costs, Ck: 
   )(1 1, tktkkkt CfMxM    (3) 
where xk is the depreciation rate of the intangible assets and f (Ckt) is the flow of intangibles 
produced with the adjustment costs incurred in period t, which in turn depends on Ik and Kk [from 
equation (2)] We assume that f ( ) increases with the expenditures in adjustment costs, Ck. 
Let  (Ks, Mks, Is, es) be the net cash flow of the firm in period s as a function of the stock 
Ks and the investment flow Is of the assets in the period, and of the random productivity shock es, 
once the non-capital inputs used in the production, for example labour, are optimized. The stock 
of intangible asset M enters the cash flow function because it is assumed to be a valuable asset. 
The cash flow function has three separate components: gross revenues from operations, 
adjustment costs, and the outlay from current market-purchased assets: 
       
j
jsjssssksssskss IpIKCeMKReIMK ,,,,,,   
Gross revenue R(.) is in turn equal to the price times the quantity of product sold, R(.) = p 
(Q (Ks,Mks)) Q(Ks,Mks), where price is non-increasing with the quantity sold (i.e. firms can have 
market power); pjs is the current market purchase price of one unit of capital asset j, and C(.) is 
given by (2). 
The economic value of the firm in period t, Vt, will be equal to the present value of 
expected future cash flows, 
 
 



  
ts
sskss
t
stt eIMKEV ,,,  (4) 
where Et is the expectations operator, conditional on the information available at the beginning of 
period t, and 
t
s  is the discount factor. 
The optimization problem of the firm is to choose I, K and M such that (4) is maximized 
subject to (1), (2) and (3). The detailed solution to this problem is presented in Appendix A. Here, 
we focus on the two equations that result from the optimization: 
 
     s
ts
s
t
sktkt
j
jtjtjtt KQKQpMzIKV  

 )(1  (5.1) 
'
Ijtjtjt Cp                        if     j≠k 
'''
IktCktIktktkt CfzCp k        if     j=k
(5.2) 
where jt and zkt are the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (2) and (3), respectively, and C’Ijt 
is the marginal adjustment cost for the investment flow in asset j [derivative with respect to 
investment flow of the adjustment cost function (2)]. 
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2.2 Discussion of the model 
Substituting C’Ij from (2) in (5.2), and re-arranging the terms, we obtain the optimal investment 
path for asset j as a function of the marginal q ratio jt/pjt= qjt. 
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1
'  
(6) 
 
The first investment equation is a formulation of the “q theory of investment” 
[Hayashi (1982)]; the second is modified to capture the assumption that adjustment costs 
generate valuable intangible assets (zk >0). According to (6), when zk >0 then the effective 
parameter of the adjustment cost for market-purchased asset k is reduced to )1( '
ktCktk
fzb  . 
This parameter is lower than in the case where intangible assets are not valuable (zk =0). 
Therefore, the theory predicts that the same q ratio will imply higher investment rate when the 
adjustment costs generate valuable intangible assets, than when no intangibles are produced. 
In the case of only one asset, under certain regularity conditions (linear homogeneous 
functions), the unobservable marginal q can be replaced by the average q [Hayashi (1982)]. For 
the multiple-asset firm, a separate q investment function for each asset cannot be specified, 
since there is no average q that provides a proxy for the marginal q for each individual asset. 
However, we can obtain the investment equation of the multi-asset firm substituting (6) in (5.1) 
and making use of the approximation
1
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. This approximation comes from the 
result that the investment rate is an increasing function of the marginal q. Rearranging terms after 
the substitution, we obtain:6 
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(7) 
Equation (7) is an extension of the investment function derived by Bond and 
Cummins (2000), to situations where: (i) firms have market power, and (ii) firms have adjustment 
costs from IT investments that become valuable intangible assets. Suppose that asset 1 is the 
material asset and the other assets are immaterial. The first term on the right-hand side of (7) is 
the marginal return of material assets when this return is estimated with the partial average q, 
                                                                          
6. Bond and Cummins (2000) derive their investment equation assuming a given proportion between tangible and intangible 
stocks of capital assets. Under this assumption, their investment equation is the same as that derived in our paper. 
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that we call qPh 


 
111 t
tPh
Kp
Vq . If the firm deploys only material assets and operates in a 
perfectly competitive market, the remaining terms on the right-hand side of (7) will be equal to 
zero, and the optimal investment rate would only depend on the partial average q ratio (as in the 
most conventional investment models). 
Our investment equation (7) considers material assets (j=1) and immaterial assets (j>1). 
The term 
1111111111 )1(
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 can be interpreted as the correction for the 
over-estimation of the marginal return of the material asset, when such return is estimated 
excluding other productive immaterial assets used by firms. The two terms of opposite sign 
tt
ktktktCktkk
Kp
Ipfz
b
b
111
'
1 )1(
)1(




-
tt
ktkt
Kpb
Mz
1111 )1( 
 appear together in (7) when the adjustment costs 
become valuable intangible assets (zkt is positive). The value of the difference gives the net 
correction in the estimate of the marginal return from investment in physical capital when the firm 
accumulates valuable intangible assets: the positive term gives the contribution to value from the 
adjustment costs accompanying investment in IT, and the negative term gives the replacement 
cost of the stock of intangible assets (from the condition that marginal value z is equal to 
marginal cost), both per unit of stock of physical capital. 
Finally,    

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, is the effect of market power in the 
investment behaviour of the bank. The effect is negative, since the increase in capacity derived 
from the new investment will imply a reduction in the price to sell the additional production. In the 
period-by-period profit-maximizing solution, the firm with market power sets the relative 
difference of price p and marginal cost mc equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand

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 )()(1   is the 
contribution to the economic value of the bank from the economic profits earned when this bank 
can set a price above its long-term average cost (assuming constant returns, that is, marginal 
cost equal to average cost). This term will be zero if the bank is a price-taker (perfectly elastic 
demand).  
Equation (7) will be the basis for the empirical analysis of the multi-asset Spanish banks, 
and for the test of the hypotheses that banks accumulated organizational capital in making IT-
related assets fully productive, and that they have market power in the loan or deposit markets. 
Bond and Cummins (2000) expressed caution over the potential estimation biases in investment 
equations on material assets that ignore the simultaneous investment in intangibles. We now add 
to these concerns the potential biases of ignoring intangibles and market power. 
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3 Application to the Spanish banking industry 
3.1  Database 
Data on Spanish commercial and savings banks, from 1984 to 2003, are collected from 
proprietary information provided by banks to the Banco de España (balance sheets, income 
statements and complementary notes) at the non-consolidated level. The banks in the sample 
represent 89.25% of the total banking assets in Spain in 2003 (the remainder are credit 
cooperatives and branches of foreign banks). The number of banks in the sample changes over 
time, from 160 in 1984 to 90 in 2003, because of mergers and acquisitions; the average number 
of observations per bank is 13.23. The paper treats the banks that result from a merger as new 
entities. We obtain estimates of the investment flow and capital stock of four main types of asset: 
Physical (KPh), Information Technology (KIT), Advertising (KAD) and Financial (KFE). Physical capital 
includes buildings (mainly branches) and durable assets.7 IT capital is set equal to the sum of the 
assets reported in the balance sheet under the heading of information technology, plus the 
capitalization of annual expenditures in IT reported in the income statement.8 Financial assets is 
the counterpart, on the asset side of the balance sheet, of bank equity remaining after financing 
the assets used in production and sales [Equity-(Physical + IT + Advertising)]. Regulatory 
requirements for the minimum capital ratio for banks explain that this difference is positive under 
normal conditions. Banks in the sample also report individual data on expenditures on training 
workers, which is used to calculate the stock of intangible capital in the form of human capital 
from training (KHK). The stocks of each of the assets are valued at current replacement cost, as 
described in Appendix B. 
In Spain, the banking industry has been unregulated for a long period of time. In line with 
previous studies [Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008)], we assume that Spanish commercial 
and savings banks operate in a monopolistic competition framework with product differentiation. 
As banks can have market power on loan markets, deposit markets, or both, we collect 
individual bank data of the interest paid to deposits, ID, and of the gross profit margins in loans, 
GLP (interest on loans minus opportunity cost of loans at the interbank interest rate) for the 
estimation of the revenues in the investment equation. For loans, we use the gross margin, rather 
than total interest payments, in order to avoid double-counting, since interest paid in deposits is 
one component of the cost of loans. 
The (fundamental) economic value of the bank will be set equal to the present value of 
the predicted future earnings, discounted at the cost of capital of the bank. We follow 
the approach of Abel and Blanchard (1986) and forecast the future earnings of each bank 
using an ARIMA econometric model. Earnings data are obtained from accounting earnings after 
adjustment for differences in criteria between costs and investments:  
 cost treplacemen at assets immaterial and material                                 
 of onDepreciati Economic Estimated-onAmortizati Accounting                                 
esExpenditur ITesExpenditur gAdvertisinEarnings AccountingEarnings Adjusted


 
                                                                          
7. Banks both rent and own their branches, so the replacement cost of physical assets has been calculated after having 
homogenized all banks as if they owned all the branches they have. We are able to do this because we know the owned and 
rented branches for each bank in the sample.  
8. This paper does not explicitly distinguish between “hardware” and “software” when referring to IT capital and all IT assets 
are named immaterial assets, because of data limitations. For example, we do not know the detailed components of IT 
expenditures reported in the income statement of banks.  
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The economic value of a bank i in year t is then calculated as follows, 
 
itit
itt
iti
t
titi
t
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itit PPPPV 
 
  1ˆˆˆˆ 3,2,2,1,,   
where 
t
stiP ,ˆ are the predicted adjusted earnings of bank i at time t+s, given the information 
available at time t using an AR(2) model; ti, is the discount factor of each bank, inversely related 
to the opportunity cost of capital of that bank at time t. The opportunity cost of capital of the 
bank is set equal to the risk-free interest rate plus a risk premium that takes into account the 
credit risk of loans plus the risk from debt leverage. 
From t+3 onwards, the level of profit of banks is calculated applying a constant 
expected growth rate i to the average of the predictions for t, t+1 and t+2, tiP . It is assumed 
that this rate of growth of profit is equal to the profit retention rate times the long-run Return On 
Equity (ROE). The proxy value of the long-term growth rate it  is obtained assuming that banks 
retain one half of their earnings, and further assuming that the long-term ROE is equal to the 
average of the ROE of the last three years (with equity valued at replacement cost). The long-
term discount factor it  has been approximated to the average of the opportunity cost of capital 
of the bank in the previous three-year period.9 
One debatable issue is whether our estimated economic value of the banks is more or 
less appropriate in valuing intangible assets as the value obtained from share prices, if the latter 
were available. It could be argued that our estimated economic value has some advantages over 
the stock market valuation, since the calculation simply follows the definition of the fundamental 
value of a bank according to the objective function of the model. Market analysts and investors 
will have no more information on economic profits and cash flows tan do we (notice that some 
data are not publicly reported; for example, expenditures on IT and advertising, owned versus 
rented branches), and so their projections to determine the recommended share price cannot be 
expected to be more accurate than ours. Moreover, share prices can be affected by bubbles that 
distort the measurement of intangibles [Bond and Cummins (2000)] and may value rents to 
current shareholders that cannot be attributed to intangible assets (for example, share prices 
may incorporate a take-over premium). 
Summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 
1 (economic value, stock of assets at replacement cost, and investment rates) and Table 2 
(statistics for the variables of the empirical investment equation). Banks differ in size and in asset 
composition. The differences in investment rates across assets reflect differences in depreciation 
rates and cross-substitution among assets. The average investment rate in physical capital is 
around 3%, similar to the depreciation rate. On the other hand, the average IT investment rate is 
42%, 7 pp higher than the depreciation rate. The stock of human capital at cost, from training 
expenditures, grows at an average rate close to 30%, while the assumed depreciation rate is 
20%. Economic value of banks increases over time, as well as the stock of all invested assets. IT 
                                                                          
9. In order to test for possible biases in our measure of the economic value of banks, for those banks listed on the market, 
we estimate the actual market value of the bank as the product of share price and number of issued shares at the end of 
each year (from 1987 to 2003). We then postulate and estimate a linear equation model, where the dependent variable is the 
actual market price, Market, and the explanatory variable is our estimated economic value of the bank, Econvalue. The 
results of the estimation are EconvalueMarket  09.183.79  (204 observations). The null hypothesis of intercept equal 
to zero and slope equal to one are not rejected at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, we have no evidence that our 
estimate of the economic value of banks is a biased estimate of their market value if they were, in fact, listed on the stock 
market. 
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and advertising capital at constant prices increase during all the sample years, while physical 
capital per worker increases only until 1996 and then begins a negative trend that persists until 
2003. In 2003, the estimated stock of IT capital per worker at constant prices is 6.3 times what it 
was in 1984, while Physical capital per worker in 2003 is 1.5 times what it was in 1984. 
Figure 1 shows the time evolution of descriptive statistics for the q ratio, calculated as 
the ratio between discounted adjusted cash flows and the assets of banks at replacement costs. 
The median q ratio of the banks in the sample is close to 3 in 1984 and falls to 0.94 in 1994. 
Since then, it rises again, but remains at values lower than 2. Increasing competition in the latter 
part of the period (coinciding with the full liberalization of the banking sector, and with Spain 
joining the Euro zone) squeezed economic profits. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation 
divided by mean) also decrease over time, indicating convergence in the estimated q across 
banks. For comparative purposes, Figure 1 also shows the median of the q ratio calculated with 
raw accounting data (profits and book-reported assets). The median of the accounting-based q 
ratio always overestimates the median of the q ratio with adjusted cash flows and assets at 
replacement cost. 
3.2 Empirical investment equation 
The empirical formulation of the investment equation (7) is written as follows: 
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(8) 
The dependent variable is the investment rate of the Physical assets. The partial q ratio 
of economic value over physical assets of the bank is expressed in logs;10 the coefficient 
)1(
1
1
1   PhKb
 is expected to be non-negative. The coefficients of the normalized investment 
flow of the remaining assets, j, are expected to be non-positive 
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We use the estimated stock of human capital from training expenditures, 
HK
HKKp as a proxy for 
the stock of intangible assets ITK
M  that result from IT investment; therefore we expect 1 =
)1( PhKPhK
ITK
b
z
 <0. It can be expected that the investment in training will increase with the 
marginal return from the intangible human capital and, thus, the investment rate in training 
expenditures HK
HK
HK
K
I)1( 
 is taken as an approximation for ITCITK fz
' . Therefore, from (7) we 
also expect 2 >0. This implies that the combined contribution of investment in IT to the 
investment rate in physical capital is given by HK
HK
IT K
I
2  , decreasing with the investment 
rate. 
                                                                          
10. Bond and Cummins (2001) provide an econometric justification for the semi-log approximation to the q model 
of investment, based on a possible multiplicative structure of the measurement error in the variables. 
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Finally, 1 <0 and 2 <0 if banks have market power in loan and deposit markets. 
We assume that the current (year t) interests on deposits, ID, and the gross margins from loans, 
GLP, are strongly correlated with the future values of the respective interest charges and 
revenues.11 
As data on investment rates present a large cross-section and time-series variation, the 
investment equation will be estimated with the first-differenced GMM estimator; all the 
estimations will contain time-dummy variables. The use of first-differences is a common practice 
in panel data estimations of the Q investment model [Hayashi and Inoue (1991); Blundell et al. 
(1992); and, more recently, Bond and Cummins (2001)]. The instruments used in the estimation 
are the lags t-2 and t-3 of the explanatory variables, since the contemporaneous values of 
investment flows, interest on loans and deposits, and other variables, could be correlated with 
the innovations of the disturbance term.12 The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the 
second-order autocorrelation test will be used to assess the validity of instruments and the 
overall estimation: the non-rejection of the Sargan test is consistent with the compatibility of the 
instruments that make up the instrument matrix. The non-rejection of the hypothesis of absence 
of second-order autocorrelation is compatible with the use of lags of the explanatory variables of 
second order or more as instruments.13 
3.3 Results 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating different versions of the investment equation that, in 
turn, respond to alternative hypotheses about the model. 
The model of Column 1 assumes that the physical assets (those reported in the balance 
sheet) are the only capital input of banks, and it ignores market power. The explanatory variable 
lnqPh (average q for physical assets in logs) has a positive and statistically significant estimated 
coefficient, as conventional q models of investment predict. Taking into account the relationship 
between the parameters of both the empirical and the theoretical investment equations, the 
estimated value of 0.023 implies a parameter of the adjustment cost function equal to  
8.44
)1(
1
1
 PhKb . 
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of the basic investment model 
for the multi-asset firm [equation (8)] as if there was no market power. The estimated coefficient 
of Phqln  is also positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients of investment 
flows in IT and advertising, and of the stock of human capital from training, are negative and 
statistically significant. Finally, the coefficient for the investment rate in financial assets is not 
statistically significant. Thus, the empirical evidence indicates (consistent with the theory) that 
                                                                          
11. Suppose a growth rate on sales of zero and a constant discount rate  <1. The predicted value for the coefficient of the 
revenues in the investment equation would be 

)1(1  where  is the price elasticity of demand. 
12. Blundell et al. (1992) contains a thorough analysis of the proper number of lags to be used as suitable instruments in the 
q investment equation. On the other hand, Bond and Cummins (2001) discuss the potential econometric problems in models 
where the explanatory variable has persistent measurement errors, as can be the case with the Tobin’s q calculated from 
stock market valuations, when these market valuations deviate from the firm’s fundamental value. Our estimates of the 
Tobin’s q are obtained with earnings forecasts and estimates of fundamental values, so it is possible to identify the 
parameters of the model with a suitable set of instruments [Bond and Cummins (2001)]. 
13. The second lag would be the minimum lag that can be used as a valid instrument in the case where the explanatory 
variables are contemporaneously correlated with the disturbance term, and the equation is first-differenced to eliminate firm-
specific effects, provided that there is no serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals uit.. Although the measurement 
errors of the q used in this paper are not related to persistent deviations between stock market valuations and the firm’s 
fundamental value (see previous footnote), for robustness purposes we have estimated the model with the instruments qt-3 
and qt-4 instead of qt-2 and qt-3, to control for potential measurement errors [Blundell et al. (1992)]. The results are similar for 
each set of instruments. 
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banks face positive adjustment costs when they expand the stock of material, IT, and advertising 
capital. However, the hypothesis that adjustment costs for financial assets are equal to zero 
cannot be rejected, which suggests that Spanish banks were able to respond smoothly to the 
requirements of regulatory capital during the sample period. The estimated coefficient of Phqln  is 
now 0.033, higher than the 0.023 in Column 1, and the new estimate of the adjustment cost 
parameter is bKPh = 31.2.14 The differences are explained by the bias induced in the estimation of 
adjustment costs for material assets, when the investment rates in non-material assets are 
omitted from the model [Bond and Cummins (2000)]. The results indicate that, in our data 
sample, not controlling for the contribution to average q of other productive assets (such as IT 
and advertising capital) overestimates the adjustment cost of investment in physical capital by 
43.5%. 
Column 3 of Table 3 shows the estimation of the investment equation of the multi-asset 
banks, including the interest flows of deposits and loans, which enter into the investment model 
when banks have market power. The negative and statistically significant estimated coefficients 
of these variables are consistent with the hypothesis that banks have market power in deposit 
and loan markets. The estimated coefficients for the remaining explanatory variables are 
statistically significant and with the expected sign, except for the investment in advertising capital 
that now is not statistically significant. The downward differences in the estimated coefficients in 
Column 3, compared with those in Column 2, can be interpreted as evidence of the biases in the 
estimated adjustment cost parameter from excluding the variables that control for the market 
power of banks in the investment equation. The biases are expected to be larger for those 
coefficients attached to the assets of banks that sustain market power. Therefore, according to 
the evidence, advertising capital appears to be the asset that contributes the most to the market 
power of banks. 
Column 4 of Table 3 shows the estimates of the investment equation for the case where 
the adjustment costs from the investment in IT produces valuable intangible assets. The 
prediction from the theoretical model is that the adjustment costs from the investment in IT 
capital should be a decreasing function of the marginal contribution of the built-in intangibles to 
the economic rents. The estimation implies a coefficient for the IT investment variable equal to 
0.403-0.401·IHK/KHK, which is smaller for higher investment rates of human capital, as expected. 
For a bank that is in the 25th percentile of the distribution of the investment rate of human 
capital (IHK/KHK = 0.10 from Table 1), the estimated coefficient of the investment in IT would be  
                                                                          
14. These estimates are in line with those obtained in previous work. For instance, Hayashi and Inoue (1991) 
obtain estimates of the coefficient of the q ratio in the investment equation between 0.017 and 0.029, with data 
from Japanese industrial firms in 1984-1986. Blundell et al. (1992) obtain an estimate of 0.0097 for 532 UK manufacturing 
companies for the 1975-1986 period, and Erickson and Whited (2000) find a coefficient between 0.033 and 0.045 for firms 
in Compustat during the 1992-95 period. All these papers use Tobin’s q calculated with stock market values of firms. Bond 
and Cummins (2001) obtain a coefficient of 0.11 when the q ratio is obtained from fundamental values based on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, and a coefficient ten times lower with the q calculated with stock market values. Our estimates of the 
fundamental value of banks are obtained in a similar way to those of Bond and Cummins, but our estimate of the coefficient 
is lower, 0.033. The economic significance of these results can be calibrated from the estimated values of the implicit 
adjustment costs. For example, from our own results,  a one standard deviation of the investment rate in physical capital 
(equal to 0.079, Table 1) from its stationary value implies an adjustment cost of 9.7% per Euro invested in the stock of 
physical capital (from (2), we have Ph
Ph
Ph
Ph KpKpC 097.0079.02
2.31 2  ). This unrealistically high adjustment cost 
estimate can be explained by the high estimated value of the adjustment cost parameter, 31.2, and by the comparatively 
high standard deviation of the variable investment rate in physical capital. From Table 1, if the coefficient of variation of the 
investment rate in physical capital was in line with the coefficient of variation of the investment rate in the other assets, the 
standard deviation of the variable would have a value close to the mean. Calculating the adjustment cost for a standard 
deviation equal to the mean of the variable (0.0308), the cost estimate is 1.5% of the stock of physical capital, a more 
reasonable figure. The high dispersion and the skewness of the dependent variable may cause some concerns about the 
possibility that the empirical results are driven by extreme values of the dependent variable, but the results shown in Table 1 
appear robust to tests performed with the data. 
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0.403-0.401·0.10=0.36. For a bank in the 75th percentile (IHK/KHK = 0.55), the estimated 
coefficient for the IT variable is 0.18. According to (6), and for a given marginal q, this reduction 
of the effective adjustment cost implies that the rate of investment in IT capital for the bank in the 
25th percentile will be one half of the rate for the bank in the 75th percentile. 
The last column of Table 3 shows the parameters estimated for the full model. 
All the previous conclusions are corroborated: intangible assets are valuable and banks have 
market power in both the deposit and loan markets. Also, the estimated adjustment costs 
parameter for the investment in financial assets is close to zero, and the estimated parameter for 
the investment in advertising variable is positive but not statistically significant. To verify the 
consistency of the results, notice that the estimated coefficient for the investment in IT variable, 
evaluated at the mean value of the investment rate in human capital, IHK/KHK = 0.292 (see 
Table 1), is equal to 0.452-0.437·0.292 = 0.324, practically the same value as the estimate in 
Column 3. 
3.3.1   Recovering the parameters of the model and valuation 
This Subsection recovers the main parameters of the original investment model (parameters bj of 
the adjustment cost function), and the main variables that determine the economic value of the 
representative bank (marginal adjustment cost and marginal contribution from rents resulting 
from market power). The summary of the results is shown in Table 4. The calculations use the 
estimates from the last column of Table 3 and take into account the correspondence between 
the parameters of the empirical model in (8), and the parameters of the theoretical formulation of 
the investment equation (7). Financial assets and advertising capital are excluded from Table 4, 
since their estimated adjustment cost parameters are not statistically significant. 
The estimated adjustment cost parameter for physical capital is 33.3, but the estimated 
marginal adjustment cost of physical capital for the representative bank is zero since the average 
investment rate in these assets is very close to the depreciation rate. For a bank with zero 
training expenditure, we estimate that the costs of intangibles built around the investment in IT 
capital amount to 5 Euros. This implies that the representative bank spends 5 additional Euros 
per Euro invested in IT capital in complementary assets in order to make this IT capital fully 
productive. At the same time, the results indicate that the marginal contribution to economic 
value of one additional Euro of stock of human capital is 40 Euros. Finally, the marginal 
contribution of rents from market power is 0.95 for the sample median value of the distribution of 
interest payments of deposits over the stock of physical assets (0.16 in the case of gross margin 
from loans). 
The economic value of the representative bank is made up of the current purchase cost 
of market-supplied assets, the adjustment costs from making these assets productive, and the 
rents from market power. From Table 1, the median values  of current purchase cost of physical, 
IT, advertising, and financial assets, amount to a total of 112.65 (49.16+3.97+1.37+58.15).15 The 
intangibles from adjustment costs that aim to make the IT capital fully productive can be 
calculated as costs or as contribution to value. In the first case, the estimated cost of intangibles 
would be 5 times the median value of the stock of IT capital, equal to 3.97 from Table 1. 
Therefore, the estimated cost of intangibles is around 20 millions of Euros. If we make the 
calculation in terms of the contribution of intangibles to the economic value of the bank, then this 
value will be equal to 40 times the median value of the stock of human capital from training (0.47 
from Table1), which represents a total contribution also close to 20 millions. Finally, the 
                                                                          
15. The stocks of assets are in millions of Euros at constant prices of 1983. 
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contribution to market value of rents from market power are equal to the marginal contribution 
times the median of the stock of physical capital (equal to 49.16 from Table 1). That is, a 
contribution of 0.95·49.16=46.7 for deposits, and of 0.16·49.16 = 7.8 for loans, or a total 
contribution of 54.5. With all these calculations, the estimated total economic value of this 
representative bank would be 112.65+20+54.5 = 187.15, slightly above the median economic 
value, from the sample data, of 181.6 (Table 1). 
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4 Conclusions and implications 
Spanish banks invested heavily in IT during the period 1984 to 2003. On average, the stock of IT 
capital per worker increased in this period from 2.9 to 21.1 thousands of constant Euros. This 
paper provides evidence of the high investment in intangible assets that was carried out at the 
same time as the investment in IT. According to our estimates, the average bank in the sample 
has spent five additional Euros in intangible assets per Euro paid in market-purchased computers 
and related assets. This implies that the replacement cost of the built-in intangibles represents 
over 10% of the economic value of the bank, and around 40% of the replacement cost of 
physical assets for the median values of the variables in the sample data. Expenditures in training 
workers are part of these adjustment costs and the resulting human capital is part of the 
intangible assets of the firm, though there will be other intangibles that are invisible to us. The 
median replacement cost of the human capital from training is around 2.5% (0.47/20) of the 
estimated replacement cost of intangibles from IT. Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) estimate 
that, in their sample of non-financial firms, each dollar invested in IT required 12 additional dollars 
of expenditure in intangibles. Compared to their findings, our sample of Spanish banks built a 
lower stock of organization capital, though the estimation procedure is also different, and 
comparisons of actual figures must be made with caution. We find no evidence of contribution to 
the economic value of banks from adjustment costs attributed to investment in physical, 
advertising, and financial assets. The finding that banks adjust the stock of financial assets 
(equity minus material and immaterial assets at replacement cost) at no appreciable adjustment 
cost suggests that banks did not face restrictions in meeting their economic capital requirements 
under changing economic conditions. 
We also find that rents from market power contribute to the economic value of the 
representative bank: for the median values of the assets at replacement costs, the rents from 
market power amount to around 28% of the economic value of the bank. The empirical evidence 
suggests that advertising capital and, to a minor extent, physical capital and intangibles, can 
explain part of the market power of banks. The rest would result from attributes specific to each 
bank not captured by the explanatory variables of the model. Neither IT-related assets, nor 
financial capital, appear to be determinants of banks’ economic rents. As a consequence, our 
empirical evidence supports the view that investment in IT does not necessarily lead to a 
competitive advantage for the bank. 
This paper has several implications for research on the economic valuation of firms. 
Assuming efficient capital markets, the market value of a listed firm is equal to the present value 
of the expected future cash flows, discounted at the proper risk-adjusted discount factor 
(fundamental value). The theory presented in this paper indicates that, if the assets invested by 
the firm satisfy the value-maximization conditions, then the market value is expected to be equal 
to the sum of the replacement cost of all the productive assets, plus the rents from market 
power. The productive assets include material, immaterial, and intangibles, according to the 
definitions for each class of assets used in this paper. If the rents from market power are zero, 
and the replacement costs of the stock of material and immaterial assets are properly estimated, 
the replacement cost of intangibles can be estimated by the difference between the market value 
and the replacement costs of material and immaterial assets. However, if the firm has market 
power (positive economic rents), this difference cannot be assimilated to the contribution of 
intangibles to economic value (replacement costs plus attributed economic rents), since all 
banks’ economic rents do not necessarily originate from intangible assets. 
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The investment equation of the multi-asset firm is directly related to the economic value 
of the bank under rational, value-maximizing behaviour. The estimated adjustment costs from 
this equation, if any, will be part of the economic value of the firm in addition to the market 
purchase cost of the respective asset. The adjustment costs can then give an estimate of the 
replacement cost of the built-in intangibles (if any), as we show in this paper. The lesson to be 
drawn from our research is that one has to be careful of possible errors due to double-counting. 
For example, expenses for training workers on how to use computers are part of the adjustment 
costs attributed to investment in IT. If we calculate the cost of intangibles from the marginal 
adjustment cost of investment in IT, as the model suggests, we do not need to add the direct 
cost of intangibles, even if we could estimate them. In our analysis, the estimated stock of human 
capital from training at replacement cost (0.47 for the median bank) should not be included in the 
calculation of the replacement cost of all the productive assets, since it is already included in the 
estimated replacement cost of all the intangibles associated with investments in IT. What our 
calculations indicate is that the cost of human capital from training workers is only a minor part of 
all the costs incurred in making the IT assets fully productive, but the actual nature of the 
remaining intangibles is unknown to us at this point in our research. 
Future research on the economic valuation and investment behaviour of the Spanish 
banks would benefit of a more disaggregated database on IT capital, and more precise 
estimates of the quality-adjusted price index of the IT capital. It would also be of interest to 
compare the results obtained in this paper with those obtained with stock market valuations of 
the equity of the banks. The number of listed banks in Spain is reduced and therefore it will be 
difficult to replicate our analysis only with banks from this country, but the number of banks could 
be expanded with listed banks from other countries. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1020 
 
REFERENCES 
ABEL, A. B., and O. BLANCHARD (1986). “The present value of profits and cyclical movements in investment”, 
Econometrica, 54, 2, pp. 249-273. 
BASU, S., J. FERNAL, N. OULTON and S. SIRINIVASAN (2003). The case of missing productivity growth, or does IT explain 
why productivity accelerated in the US but not in the UK?, NBER Macro Annual, also available as HIER Discussion Paper 
2921. 
BHARADWAJ, S., S. G. BHARADWAJ and B. R. KONSYNSKI (1999). “Information technology effects on firm performance 
as measured by Tobin’s q”, Management Science, 45, 7, pp. 1008-1024. 
BECALLI, E. (2007). “Does IT investment improve bank performance? Evidence from Europe?”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 31, 7, pp. 2205-2230. 
BLAIR, M., and S. WALLMAN (2001). Unseen Wealth: Report of the Brookings Task Force on Intangibles, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington DC. 
BLUNDELL, R., S. BOND, M. DEVEREUX and F. SCHIANTARELLI (1992). “Investment and Tobin’s q: Evidence from 
company panel data”, Journal of Econometrics, 51, pp. 233-258. 
BOND, S., and J. CUMMINS (2000). “The stock market and investment in the new economy: Some tangible facts and 
intangible fictions”, Brookings Papers, pp. 61-124. 
― (2001). Noisy share prices and the Q model of Investment, IFS, Working Paper 01/22. 
BOND, S., and C. MEGHIR (1994). “Dynamic investment models and the firm’s financial policy”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 61, pp. 197-222. 
BRESNAHAN, T., E. BRYNJOLFSSON and L. HITT (2002). “Information technology, workplace organization and the demand 
for skilled labor: Firm level evidence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, pp. 339-376. 
BRYNJOLFSSON, E., L. HITT and S. YANG (2002). “Intangible assets: Computers and organization capital”, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 137-181. 
BRYNJOLFSSON, E., and S. YANG (1999). “The intangible costs and benefits of computer investment: Evidence from 
financial markets”, Atlanta, Georgia: Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems. 
BUIGES, P., A. JACQUEMIN and J. F. MARCHIPONT (eds.) (2000). Competitiveness and the Value of Intangible Assets, 
Edward Elgar, Mass. 
CARR, N. (2003). “IT Doesn’t Matter”, Harvard Business Review, 81, pp. 41-50. 
COCKBURN, I., and Z. GRILICHES (1988). “Industry Effects and Appropriability Measures in the Stock Market’s Valuation of 
R&D and Patents”, American Economic Review, 78, pp. 419-23. 
CORRADO, C., J. HALTIWANGER and D. SICHEL (eds.) (2005). Measuring Capital in the New Economy, NBER Studies in 
Income and Wealth, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
CORRADO C., C. HULTEN and D. SICHEL (2009). “Intangible Capital and Economic Growth”, Review of Income and 
Wealth, 55, pp. 661-685. 
CUMMINS, J. (2004). A new approach to the valuation of intangible capital, NBER Working Papers, No. 9924. 
ERICKSON, T., and T. WHITED (2000). “Measurement Error and the Relationship between Investment and q”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 108, pp. 1027-1057. 
FUKAO, K., T. MIYAGAWA, K. MUKAI and Y. SHINODA (2009). “Intangible Investment in Japan: Measurement and 
Contribution to Economic Growth”, Review of Income and Wealth, 55, pp. 717-736. 
GRILICHES, Z. (1981). “Market value, R&D and patents, Economic Letters, 7, pp. 183-187. 
HALL, B. (1993). “The Stock market valuation of R&D investment during the 1980s”, American Economic Review, 83, 
pp. 259-264. 
HALL, R. (2001). “The stock market and capital accumulation”, American Economic Review, 91, 6, pp. 1185-1202. 
HAYASHI, F. (1982). “Tobin’s marginal q and average q: A neoclassical interpretation”, Econometrica, 50, pp. 213-224. 
HAYASHI, F., and T. INOUE (1991). “The relation between firm growth and Q with multiple capital goods: Theory and 
evidence from panel data on Japanese firms”, Econometrica, Vol. 59, 3, pp. 731-753. 
HIRSCHEY, M., and J. WEYGANDT (1985). “Amortization policy for advertising and research and development 
expenditures”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, pp. 326-335. 
HULTEN, CH., and X. HAO (2008). What is a company really worth? Intangible capital and the “market to book” value puzzle, 
NBER Working Papers, No. 14548. 
LEV, B. (2001). Intangibles: Management, measurement, and reporting, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC. 
LEV, B., and S. RADHAKRISHNAN (2005). “The measurement of firm specific organizational capital”, in C. Corrado, 
J. Haltiwanger and D. Sichel (eds.), Measuring capital in the new economy, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 65, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 73-99. 
LICHTENBERG, F. (1995). “The output contribution of computer equipment and personnel: a firm level analysis”, Journal of 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 3, pp. 201-217. 
MARRANO, M. G., J. HASKEL and G. WALLIS (2009). “What happened to the knowledge economy? ICT, Intangible 
Investment, and Britain’s Productivity”, Review of Income and Wealth, 55, pp. 686-716. 
MARTÍN-OLIVER, A., and V. SALAS-FUMÁS (2008). “The Output and Profit Contribution of Information Technology and 
Advertising Investments in Banks”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 17, pp. 229-255. 
MARTÍN-OLIVER, A., V. SALAS-FUMÁS and J. SAURINA (2007). Measurement of Capital Stock and Input Services of 
Spanish Banks”, Working Paper No. 0711, Banco de España. 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1020 
 
 
MAS, M., and J. QUESADA (2005). Las nuevas tecnologías y el crecimiento económico en España, Fundación BBVA, 
Madrid. 
OLINER, S., D. SICHEL and K. STIROH (2007). “Explaining a Productive Decade”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
1, pp. 81-152. 
PRESCOTT, E., and M. VISSCHER (1980). “Organization capital”, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 3, pp. 446-461. 
SCHIANTARELLY, F., and D. GEORGOUTSOS (1990). “Imperfect competition, Tobin’s q and investment: Evidence from 
aggregate UK data”, European Economic Review, 34, pp. 1061-1078. 
VILLALONGA, B. (2004). “Intangible resources, Tobin’s q and sustainability of performance differences”, Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization, 54, pp. 205-230. 
WILDASIN, D. (1984). “The q Theory of Investment with Many Capital Goods”, The American Economic Review, 74, pp. 203-
210. 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1020 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of market value, capital stocks and 
Investment rates, 1984-2003 
              
    Average Median Std.Dev. P25 P75 
            
Market value Vit (m€)   799.6 181.6 2,423 58.11 565.4
Capital stocks (m€)             
   KPh   166.5 49.16 427.3 14.40 128.8
   KIT   7.38 3.97 8.04 1.03 10.85
   KAD   3.46 1.37 4.19 0.32 5.39
   KFE   208.5 58.15 411.1 18.18 201.2
   KHK   2.3 0.47 6.4 0.00 4.8
Investment rates (%)             
   IPh / KPh   3.08 1.70 7.92 0.47 5.47
   IIT / KIT   41.99 41.64 14.53 34.10 49.41
   IAD / KAD   37.30 36.05 13.03 31.19 42.06
   IFE / KFE   17.00 13.15 35.66 4.97 27.22
   IHK / KHK   29.21 25.29 18.43 10.13 55.60
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory 
variables 
              
    Average Median Std.Dev. P25 P75 
            
Dependent variable             
   IPh / KPh   3.08 1.70 7.92 0.47 5.47
Explanatory variables              
   qPh   5.7 4.07 6.1 1.23 8.3
   IIT / KPh, (%)   7.7 6.0 7 3.41 9.7
   IAd / KPh, (%)   2.6 2.07 2.1 0.94 3.6
   IFE / KPh, (%)   25.35 12.79 79.29 0.97 28.11
   KHK / KPh, (%)   0.95 0.57 1.45 0.06 1.38
   ID / KPh , (%)   114.6 95.17 115.9 50.53 148.9
   GLP / KPh , (%)   26.9 18.53 44.5 1.29 37.5
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Table 3: Estimations of the investment equation 
                  
  qPh   0.023 *** 0.033 *** 0.031 *** 0.034 *** 0,031
      (0.008)   (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.007)   (0.010)
  IIT / KPh       -0.301 *** -0.325 ** -0.403 *** -0.452
          (0.110)  (0.132)  (0.141)   (0.164)
  IAd / KPh       -1.428 ** -1.405   -1.176 ** -0.763
          (0.580)  (0.908)  (0.545)   (0.862)
  IFE / KPh       -0.003   -0.010   -0.002   -0,.006
          (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.005)   (0.009)
  KHK / KPh       -1.655 *** -1.408 *** -1.493 *** -1.240
          (0.496)  (0.412)  (0.535)   (0.399)
  IIT / KPh ∙ IHK / KHK           0.401 ** 0.437
              (0.187)   (0.185)
  ID / KPh           -0.027 *     -0.031
            (0.015)      (0.016)
  GLP / KPh          -0.025 *     -0.027
            (0.015)      (0.016)
  
Time 
Dummies   Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes
  Sargan   0.115   0.089  0.101  0.157   0.171
  1st order   0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000
  2nd order   0.368   0.697  0.939  0.760   0.894
  N.Obs   1667   1667  1667  1667   1667
                   
 
Notes: 
(***)=Significant at 1%; (**)= Significant at 5% (*)=Significant at 10%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimation method is First-Difference GMM. 
Sargan and 1st and 2nd order present the p-values of the Sargan test and the tests of no existence of first 
and second-order autocorrelation, respectively. 
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Table 4: Estimated parameters of the investment equation, marginal 
adjustment costs and marginal contributions to value, for the 
representative bank. 
      Equation Value 
        
ADJUSTMENT COST PARAMETER (b)       
    Physical Assets 
  
    IT Assets ( IKH/KKH =0) 
 
 
        
IMPLICIT MARGINAL ADJUSTMENT COST (C’Ij/pj)     
    Physical Assets 
 
      
      
    IT Assets ( IKH/KKH =0) 
      
      
        
MARGINAL RETURN       
    Intangibles ( zk ) 
 
  
 
    
        
CONTRIBUTION FROM MARKET POWER       
    Deposits 
 
    
 
    
    Loans     
 
  
 
      
 
The estimated marginal adjustment cost is obtained from the approximation
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Figure 1: Time evolution of descriptive statistics of the estimated 
Tobin’s Q  
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Appendix A. Derivation of optimization problem of the firm 
The economic value of the firm in period t, Vt, will be equal to the present value of expected 
future cash flows, 
 



  
ts
ssss
t
stt eIMKEV ,,,   
where Et is the expectations operator, conditional on the information available at the beginning of 
period t, and  ts is the discount factor. 
The optimisation problem of the firm is to choose I, K and M such that  
Maximize   



  
ts
ssss
t
stt eIMKEV ,,,   
subject to  (A1), (A2) and (A3).  
If j,t+s is the multiplier of the respective constraint in (A1) and zj,t+s the respective 
multiplier of (A3), the first order conditions of the maximization problem are, respectively for I, K 
and M: 
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If price is a function of quantity, for any time period t we have 
J
C
J
Q
Q
pQ
J
QQp
J 





 )(  
for J = K, M. Let ε =
Q
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p
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  be the price elasticity of demand changed of sign (positive value).  
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If  Q=F(K,M) is linear homogeneous in K and M then, 
.)(1)(
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j jj
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

    (A7) 
Since C ( ) does not depend on M. Multiplying both sides of (A5) by Kj and adding and 
subtracting jtjt I  we have 
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Making use of (A4) and arranging the terms, 
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Repeating the exercise with Mj in (A6), 
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Since the adjustment cost function tC (  ) in (A2) is also linear homogeneous in K and I, 
summing over all j and taking into account (A7) we have, 
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Solving recursively, 
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Finally, the economic value at the optimal solution is equal to, 
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The investment model in the main text follows from (A8), (A4), (A5) and (A6) for the 
particular case where only one asset, IT, generates intangible assets as a result of adjustment 
costs. 
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Appendix B. Summary of the methodology used to estimate the stock of material and 
immaterial assets for Spanish banks 
For each bank, data are available on the year-by-year investment flow in Physical assets, 
Advertising, and IT. Data are obtained from confidential accounting statements reported by 
banks to the Banco de España [see Martín-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007) for more 
details]. The stock of a particular asset in year t, at current replacement cost, is obtained 
applying the permanent inventory method: 
 11
11
1



 tt
t
t
tttt Kpp
p
IpKp 
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where It is the gross investment flow of new capital services in year t; Kt the stock of 
homogeneous capital services at the end of year t;  the depreciation rate of the asset used in 
production activities during a one-year period;  the rate of technological progress incorporated 
into capital services invested during one year, with respect to those invested one year before, 
and pt is the price of one unit of services in period t. The term (1-)/(1+) will be substituted by 
(1-) where  is the overall economic depreciation rate. 
For each bank, we estimate the yearly investment flow in Physical assets, Advertising, 
IT, Financial assets, and Human Capital. Data come from the confidential accounting statements 
reported by commercial and savings banks to the Banco de España, beginning in 1980. The 
price indices used for the estimation of pt/pt-1 and the values of the depreciation rates, , that 
enter into the permanent inventory equation, are summarized in Table B1. The depreciation rates 
are in line with those used in the literature: Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) for advertising, 
Litchenberg (1995) for IT and Hall (1993) for R&D/ human capital. Financial assets do not 
depreciate. The physical assets include buildings, for which we assume a depreciation rate of 
2.5%, and equipment, with a depreciation rate of 15%. The weighted depreciation rate for the 
sum of the two rates gives a composite depreciation rate of 3% used in the calculation. 
A price index of quality-adjusted IT capital is not available. Mas and Quesada (2005) 
estimate price indices for hardware and for software assets in Spain; their estimates show a 
decreasing trend in the prices of quality-adjusted hardware, but an increase in the price 
index of quality-adjusted software. In this paper, we assume that the rate of technical 
progress incorporated in IT capital has a magnitude similar to the increase in production 
costs, resulting in 1/(1+ ) = pt/pt-1. This is equivalent to assuming that the current values of 
the stock of all IT capital are at constant prices (i.e. the price index is set equal to 1). The zero 
inflation rate of the price of quality-adjusted IT capital services contrasts the -15% to -20% 
decline assumed in other studies with US data [Litchenberg (1995)]. The results of Mas and 
Quesada (2005), and our assumption of zero inflation, can be justified due to the higher 
general inflation in Spain than in the US, and because, in general, technological innovations 
are introduced later in Spain than in the US, and they sell at a starting price lower than the 
price at which they were first introduced in the market. 
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Table B1: Sources of data in the computation of capital stocks at 
replacement cost. 
             
    
Investment flow  =Economic Depreciation   Price Index 
             
Material            
 Buildings 
  
Difference between book value at t 
and t-1 from balance sheet data 
 
0.03 
  
Residential (Ministerio 
de Vivenda)      
     
Non-IT Equipment 
  
Book value 
 
0.15 
  
Market Services (INE)     
     
Immaterial            
IT Equipment 
  
Book value 
 
0.35 
  
See in the text      
     
IT Services 
  
Expenditures flow from income 
statement 
 
0.35 
  
See in the text      
     
Advertising 
  
Expenditures flow from income 
statement 
 
0.35 
  
Market Services (INE)     
     
Training 
  
Expenditures flow from income 
statement 
 
0.20 
  
Educational Services 
(INE)      
     
Financial Assets 
  
Difference between book value at t 
and t-1 from balance sheet data 
 
0.00 
  
Consumption Price 
Index (INE)      
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